Phật Giáo Việt Nam 1963 - Song Ngữ

04/06/20234:17 SA(Xem: 10230)
Phật Giáo Việt Nam 1963 - Song Ngữ

phat giao viet nam nam 1963 -song ngu 2
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Trong năm 1963, Phật giáo Việt Nam đã trải qua một số sự kiện quan trọng và khó khăn do tình hình chính trị và xã hội diễn ra trong giai đoạn đó. Dưới đây là một tóm lược về lịch sử Phật giáo Việt Nam trong năm 1963 qua các văn kiện trao đổi giữa sứ quán Hoa kỳ tại Sài Gòn và Bộ Ngoại Giao Mỹ:

Xảy ra cuộc biểu tình của các Phật tử tại Huế: Vào tháng 5 năm 1963, một cuộc biểu tình quy mô lớn đã diễn ra tại Huế, do các Phật tử yêu cầu chính quyền miền Nam Việt Nam (do chính phủ của Ngô Đình Diệm lãnh đạo) tôn trọng quyền tự do tôn giáochấm dứt việc áp bức Phật giáo. Cuộc biểu tình này đã bị đàn áp bởi quân đội và cảnh sát, dẫn đến nhiều người thiệt mạng.

Sự kiện tự thiêu của Hòa thượng Thích Quảng Đức: Vào ngày 11 tháng 6 năm 1963, Hòa thượng Thích Quảng Đức, trụ trì chùa Quan Thế Âm ở Gia Định (nay thuộc TP.HCM), đã vị pháp thiêu thân để phản đối chính sách kỳ thị tôn giáo của chính phủ miền Nam Việt Nam. Hình ảnh cảnh sát và quân đội miền Nam Việt Nam đứng bất động trước sự kiện bi hùng này đã lan truyền khắp thế giới, gây chấn động và thu hút sự chú ý quốc tế đối với tình hình tôn giáo tại Việt Nam.

Đối đầu giữa Phật giáo và chính quyền: Trong giai đoạn này, chính quyền miền Nam Việt Nam dưới sự lãnh đạo của Tổng thống Ngô Đình Diệm đã thực hiện một số biện pháp cưỡng chế và kiểm soát với Phật giáo. Các chính sách bắt buộc như việc cấm treo cờ Phật giáo tại các chùa, không xem Phật giáo là một giáo hội tôn giáo và đặt Phật giáo dưới quyền kiểm soát của nhà nước đã gây phản đối mạnh mẽ từ các nhà sưPhật tử.

Sự ảnh hưởng của sự kiện lên Phật giáo: Cuộc biểu tìnhsự kiện tự thiêu của Hòa thượng Thích Quảng Đức đã gây ra sự chấn động mãnh liệt và tăng cường sự phản đối chính sách của chính phủ miền Nam Việt Nam. Các nhà sưPhật tử tiếp tục đấu tranh cho quyền tự do tôn giáocông bằng xã hội.

Tóm lại, năm 1963 là một năm đầy biến động và khó khăn cho Phật giáo Việt Nam, với những sự kiện quan trọng như cuộc biểu tình tại Huế và sự kiện tự thiêu của Hòa thượng Thích Quảng Đức, tạo nên một cảnh quan chính trị và tôn giáo nổi bật trong lịch sử Phật giáo Việt Nam thời hiện đại.

Dưới đây là các văn kiện trao đổi giữa tòa đại sứ Hoa Kỳ tại Việt Nam và bộ ngoại giao Hoa Kỳ cũng như các tư liệu liên quan đến Phật giáo trong năm 1963 đã được giải mật, được dịch giả Nguyên Giác chuyển ngữ với phần audio qua giọng đọc nam và nữ gốc Mỹ.

Xem thêm: Nhìn Lại Cuộc Chính Biến Năm 1963 qua Các Tài Liệu Giải Mật Của Mỹ



SỰ KIỆN 8 THÁNG 5 NĂM 1963 &
CÁC CUỘC BIỂU TÌNH TẠI CỐ ĐÔ HUẾ


01- Ngày 9 tháng 5/1963. From the Consulate at Hue: Buddha Birthday Celebration Hue May 8 erupted into large-scale demonstration at Hue Radio Station between 2000 hours local and 2330 hours.
02- Ngày 10 tháng 5/1963. From the Consulate at Hue: GVN mobile loudspeakers roamed streets evening May 9 calling on population stay calm, avoid public assemblies, respect curfew.
03- Ngày 10 tháng 5/1963. From the Consulate at Hue: May 10 meeting 10:30 hours local at Tu Dam Pagoda attended by estimated five or six thousand Buddhists. Crowd orderly. ARVN troops and police in area. Province Chief Dang present.
04- Ngày 10 tháng 5/1963. Manifesto of Vietnamese Buddhist Clergy and Faithful: The incident which occurred three days ago really affected morale. Blood flowed and human lives were once again sacrificed, so we are now determined to place our hopes before the government and to request the following points
05- Ngày 18 tháng 5/1963. Lodge: delegation Buddhist leaders met with President Diem to present series of demands. Give Buddhists rights with Catholics.
06- Ngày 22 tháng 5/1963. Lodge: During meeting with Diem May 18, he devoted about two hours to Buddhist questions. It .was quite clear that he is convinced that (a) Hue incident was provoked by Buddhist leaders, (b) deaths were caused by grenade or grenades thrown by VC or other dissidents and not by GVN
07- Ngày 29 tháng 5/1963. Telegram From the Department of State. New York Times today reports Buddhists still very upset by Hue incident and failure GVN take meaningful steps toward religious equality.
08- Ngày 30 tháng 5/1963. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam. The semi-official Vietnam Presse published text of GVN communique2 affirming freedom of religion in VN and reiterating that national flag must be given supremacy.
09- Bilingual: Vietnam 1963: Who Is Mr. William C. Trueheart 
10- Bilingual: 140. Telegram From The Embassy In Vietnam To The Department Of State
11- Bilingual: 141. Telegram From The Embassy In Vietnam To The Department Of State
12- Bilingual: 142. Telegram From The Embassy In Vietnam To The Department Of State
13- Bilingual: Recalling A 60-year-ago Event: Most Venerable Thích Quảng Đức Burnt Himself To Safeguard The Dharma
14- Bilingual: 143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
15- Bilingual: 144. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
16- Bilingual: 145. Current Intelligence Memorandum Prepared In The Office Of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
17- Bilingual: 146. Telegram From The Embassy In Vietnam To The Department Of State
18- Bilingual: 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
19- Bilingual: 148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
20- Bilingual: 149. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
21- Bilingual: 150. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
22- Bilingual: 151. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
23- Bilingual: 152. Letter From the Director of USIA to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
24- Bilingual: 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
25- Bilingual: 154. Editorial Note / Ghi chú của người biên tập
26- Bilingual: 155. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
      Bilingual: The Quảng Đức Flame / Ngọn Lửa Quảng Đức
27- Bilingual: 157. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
28- Bilingual: 158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
29- Bilingual: 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
30- Bilingual: 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
31- Bilingual: 161. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
32- Bilingual: 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State

SỰ KIỆN TỰ THIÊU CỦA HÒA THƯỢNG THÍCH QUẢNG ĐỨC:
33- Bilingual: 163. From the Embassy: Venerable Quang Duc set himself on fire / HT Quảng Đức tự thiêu.
34- Bilingual: 164. From the Embassy: Sinh viên Phật tử cố thủ ở Chùa Xá Lợi / Buddhist students formed cordon around Xa Loi Pagoda
35- Bilingual: 165. From the Embassy: Tham mưu trưởng KQVN Đỗ Khắc Mai lộ ý đảo chính / VNAF Chief of Staff (Lt. Col. Do Khac Mai) hinted of a coup
36- Bilingual: 166. From the Embassy: than phiền vì kỳ thị tôn giáo / grievance at religious discrimination
37- Bilingual: 167. From the Department of State: Năm điểm PG đề nghị là hợp lý và đúng đắn / The five points suggested by Buddhists are reasonable and proper rights
38- Bilingual: 168. From the Embassy: Hue delegation arrived at Xa Lợi Pagoda / Phái đoàn Huế tới Chùa Xá Lợi
39- Bilingual: 169. From the Embassy: Tiếp tục bắt Phât tử ở Huế, Đà Nẵng/ Arrests were continuing in Danang and Hue
40- Bilingual: 170. From the Embassy. Thích Tịnh Khiết was very weak after 5-day fast / Thầy Tịnh Khiết yếu sức sau 5 ngày tuyệt thực
41- Bilingual: 172. From the Embassy: Buddhists to avoid all manifestations / Phật tử sẽ tránh mọi biểu hiện
42- Bilingual: 173. From Prince Sihanouk to President Kennedy / Từ Hoàng tử Sihanouk gửi Tổng thống Kennedy
43- Bilingual: 177. From the Embassy: riot instigated by approximately 250 students / Bạo động bùng phát với 250 sinh viên
44- Bilingual: 180. From the Embassy: Diem suffered severe loss of confidence in Vietnam / TT Diệm mất sự tin tưởng từ dân VN
45. Bilingual: 182. Thông điệp của Tổng thống [Hoa Kỳ] Kennedy gửi Hoàng thân [Cam Bốt] Sihanouk
46. Bilingual: 183. Research: Coup Prospects / Triển vọng đảo chánh
47. Bilingual: 184. From the Embassy: a campaign by the Nhus to sabotage the agreement / ông bà Nhu phá hoại thỏa thuận với Phật Giáo
48. Bilingual: 185. From the Embassy: serious loss of support for GVN at home and abroad / Chính phủ Diệm mất sự ủng hộ nghiêm trọng cả trong và ngoài VN
49. Bilingual: 186. From the Embassy: Thuan: how stubborn Diem was / [Bộ Trtưởng] Thuần: Diệm cứng đầu
50. Bilingual: 187. From the Department: Peril of the present situation / Sự nguy hiểm của tình hình hiện tại
51. Bilingual: 190. CIA Report: Sinh viên bị giam vì biểu tình chưa được thả / Students detained for protests have not been released yet
52. Bilingual: 191. From the Department: Deadline passed; US urges Diem to implement the agreement with Buddhists / Hạn chót đã qua; Mỹ hối thúc Diệm thực thi thỏa thuận với Phật Giáo
53. Bilingual: 192. From the Embassy: Talking around for two and a half hours, Diem avoided the question of Buddhism / Nói quanh co trong 2 giờ rưỡi, Diệm tránh câu hỏi về Phật giáo
54. Bilingual: 193. From the Embassy. The US received news that Tran Kim Tuyen was planning a coup / Mỹ nghe tin Trần Kim Tuyến dự định đảo chánh
55. Bilingual. 194. From the Embassy: GVN not intending to live up to its end of bargain / Chính phủ Diệm không có ý định tôn trọng thỏa thuận với PG
56. Bilingual: 196. From the Department: US urges Diem to fulfill his promise to Buddhism / Mỹ hối thúc Diệm thực hiện lời hứa với Phật Giáo
57. Bilingual: 198. From the Embassy: Article openly dared Buddhists to carry out further burnings immediately / Bài báo của Ngô Đình Nhu thách Phật tử công khai tự thiêu tức khắc
58. Bilingual: 199. From the Department. ...critical of religious situation in Viet-Nam / chỉ trích về đàn áp tôn giáo tại VN
59. Bilingual: 200. From the Embassy. Diem stays silent, not promising to implement the agreement with Buddhism / Diệm I'm lặng, không hứa thực thi thỏa thuận với Phật Giáo
60. Bilingual. 201. Letter. The US asked Diem to give a speech on religious tolerance / Mỹ yêu cầu TT Diệm đọc bài diễn văn về bao dung tôn giáo
61. Bilingual. 202. Memo from NSC to President Kennedy: Our policy is still to discourage a coup / Thư NSC trình TT Kenney: chính sách chúng ta là ngăn cản đảo chính.
62. Bilingual: 203. From the Embassy. Thuan: Diem was probably going to do nothing / Thuần: có lẽ TT Diệm sẽ không làm gì hết (không thực hiện thỏa thuận đã ký với PG)
63. Bilingual: 204. From The Embassy. [trueheart] Put Off Request For Appointment With Nhu / [quyền Đại Sứ Trueheart] Hủy Yêu Cầu Hẹn Gặp Với Ông Ngô Đình Nhu
64. Bilingual: 205. Memo. President Kennedy And The Conversation About Gvn’s Buddhist Policy / TT Kennedy: Thảo Luận Về Chính Sách Phật Giáo Của TT Diệm
65. Bilingual. 208. Memo. Nolting: the more Diem was prodded the slower he went / Đại sứ Nolting: càng hối thúc, TT Diệm càng trì trệ
66. Bilingual: 210. From the Embassy: Altercation between Vietnamese plainclothes police and American correspondents / Xô xát giữa giữa cảnh sát chìm VN và phóng viên Mỹ
67. Bilingual. 211. Telegram from 4 US reporters to President Kennedy / Điện văn từ 4 phóng viên Mỹ gửi TT Kennedy
68, Bilingual. 212. Report. CIA: There are 3 groups planning a coup / CIA: Thấy có 3 nhóm dự tính đảo chính
69. Bilingual: 213. From the Embassy. Buddhists asked the US military to protect Xa Loi Pagoda / Phật tử xin quân lực Mỹ bảo vệ Chùa Xá Lợi.
70. Bilingual. 214. From the Embassy. Diem was silent, Times of Vietnam attacked Buddhists / Diệm im lặng, báo Times of Vietnam tấn công Phật tử
71. Bilingual: 215. Memo. Forrestal: Diem will probably adopt more rigorous and oppressive policies toward the activist Buddhist leadership / Forrestal: có lẽ ông Diệm sẽ hà khắc và đàn áp hơn đối với giới lãnh đạo Phật giáo
72. Bilingual. 216. From the Embassy in the Philippines. Bowles: Diem regime is probably doomed / Bowles: Chế độ Diệm có lẽ sắp sụp đổ
73. Bilingual: CIA: Diem is unlikely to fulfill his commitment to the Buddhists; Expected to have a coup / CIA: ông Diệm lộ vẻ sẽ không thực hiện cam kết với Phật tử; dự kiến sẽ có đảo chính
74. Bilingual: 218. Ambassador Nolting arrived in Vietnam and tried to play it down / Đại sứ Nolting đến VN, cố gắng làm dịu tình hình
75. Bilingual: 219. Nolting: Diem is not completely in control of his government’s actions (Nhus) / Nolting: Diệm không hoàn toàn kiểm soát được hành động của chính phủ Diệm (ông bà Nhu)
76. Bilingual. 220. Memo. CIA: Nhu is Planning a Coup against President Diem / CIA: Nhu đang lên kế hoạch đảo chính lật đổ TT Diệm
77. Bilingual: 221. Telegram. Over 100 bonzes gathered before Ambassador’s residence / Hơn 100 nhà sư biểu tình trước tư gia Đại sứ Mỹ
78, Bilingual: 222. Nolting: personal action by Diem required / Nolting: cần ông Diệm hành động trực tiếp
79, Bilingual. 224. Nolting urged Diem to deliver a speech for the implementation June 16 agreements / Nolting hối thúc TT Diệm đọc diễn văn thi hành thỏa thuận đã ký với Phật tử ngày 16/6/1963
80. Bilingual: 225. President Kennedy: difficulties between the Buddhists and the South Vietnamese Government were impeding / TT Kennedy: khó khăn giữa Phật tử và Chính phủ Nam VN đang cản trở...
81. Bilingual. 226. Nhu: there was a kind of bad U.S. conscience about this war / Nhu: có một kiểu lương tâm của Hoa Kỳ nghĩ xấu về cuộc chiến này
82. Bilingual. 227. Nolting: police attacked protesters, but GVN news reports say protesters attacked police / Nolting: cảnh sát tấn công người biểu tình, nhưng bản tin chính phủ VNCH nói người biểu tình tấn công cảnh sát
83. Bilingual. 228. President Diem broadcast a message / Tổng thống Diệm gửi thông điệp toàn dân
84. Bilingual. 229. Nolting: Saigon pagodas still barricaded, detained demonstrators still held / Nolting: Các chùa Sài Gòn vẫn còn bị rào phong tỏa, người biểu tình bị giam vẫn chưa thả
85. Bilingual. 230. Rusk: These Buddhist demands seem reasonable even if motivated by political aims / Các đòi hỏi này của Phật tử có vẻ hợp lý ngay cả khi được thúc đẩy bởi mục tiêu chính trị.
86. Bilingual. Bowles: We cannot achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia as long as Diem and his family run Vietnam / Bowles: Mỹ không thể đạt được mục tiêu ở Đông Nam Á chừng nào ông Diệm và gia đình ông Diệm còn cai trị VN
87. Bilingual: 232. Nolting: GVN has badly underestimated and mishandled Buddhist problem./ Nolting: Chính phủ VN đã đánh giá thấp và xử lý sai vấn đề Phật giáo.
88. Bilingual. 233. Department of State: Waiting to see if Diem releases those arrested in demonstrations, lifts barricades / Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ: Chờ xem Diệm có thả những người bị bắt trong biểu tình, gỡ bỏ rào chắn quanh chùa hay không
89Bilingual. 234. Rusk: Continuing GVN failure act promptly enough to meet legitimate Buddhist grievances and to show true spirit of conciliation / Ngoại trưởng Rusk: Chính phủ Diệm không chịu kịp thời đáp ứng các bất bình chính đáng của Phật giáo và để thể hiện tinh thần hòa giải thực sự
90. Bilingual. 235. Nolting: chances of survival of this government has risen / Nolting: cơ hội tồn tại của chính phủ Diệm đã tăng lên
91. Bilingual. 236. Lansdale: saw the steady deterioration in the Diem regime over a period of years / Lansdale: đã thấy sự suy thoái đều đặn của chế độ Diệm qua nhiều năm
92. Bilingual. 237. Nolting: we should maximize this government’s chances of survival / Nolting: chúng ta nên tối đa hóa cơ hội sống sót của chính phủ ông Diệm
93. Bilingual. 238. Us: Encouraging Diem And Nhu To Seek As Much Contact With The Correspondents As Possible / Hoa Kỳ: Khuyến Khích Diệm Và Nhu Liên Lạc Với Các Phóng Viên Mỹ Càng Nhiều Càng Tốt
94. Bilingual. 239. Report sent to President Kennedy about American reporters in Vietnam / Bản báo cáo gửi lên Tổng Thống Kennedy về các phóng viên Mỹ tại VN
95. Bilingual. 240. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
96. Bilingual. 241. Big demonstration planned by Buddhists for Tuesday, July 30, 1963; Self-sacrifice of Buu Hoi’s mother also forecast by her for this date. / Phật tử lên kế hoạch biểu tình lớn vào Thứ Ba 30/7/1963; Ni trưởng Diệu Huệ, mẹ của Bửu Hội (Đại sứ VN tại Mỹ) dự tính tự thiêu ngày này.
97. Bilingual.243. WAH said he ought to be recalled at once / Thứ trưởng Ngoại giao W. Averell Harriman nói Đại sứ Nolting nên bị triệu hồi về Mỹ ngay
98. Bilingual. 245. Novice Bonze Huyhn Van Le Burned Himself To Death / Sa Di Huỳnh Văn Lễ (bồ Tát Thích Nguyên Hương) Tự Thiêu
99. Bilingual. 247. Nolting: If He Was Telling Me The Truth, He Is A Most Misunderstood Man / Nolting: Nếu Ông Nhu Đang Nói Sự Thật Với Tôi, Nhu Là Người Bị Hiểu Lầm Nhiều Nhất
100Bilingual. 248. Mrs. Nhu: Mr. Diem wants to reconcile with Buddhism because he wants the circle to have corners / Bà Nhu: Ông Diệm muốn hòa giải với Phật giáo là muốn vòng tròn có góc
101. Bilingual. 249. Mrs. Nhu: all the Buddhists had done was to “barbecue a bonze” with “imported gasoline.” The US asked Diem to send her out of the country. / Bà Nhu: tất cả những gì Phật tử đã làm là “nướng sư” bằng “xăng nhập cảng.” Mỹ yêu cầu ông Diệm đưa bà Nhu ra khỏi VN.
102. Bilingual. 250. Tran Van Chuong (Madame Nhu’s father) scolded Mrs. Nhu. Possibilities: Further church admonition to Archbishop Thuc; “Leave of absence” for Madame Nhu, perhaps in Rome / Đại sứ Trần Văn Chương (thân phụ của bà Nhu) rầy bà Nhu. Có thể: Giáo hội CG sẽ có thêm lời rầy đối với TGM Ngô Đình Thục; Đưa bà Nhu "nghỉ phép," có lẽ ở Rome.
103Bilingual. 251. Thuan: Madame Nhu had organized a secret police squad of her own, headed by her brother, Tran Van Khiem, and that already “illegal arrests” have been made by this group / Thuần: Bà Nhu lập 1 đơn vị mật vụ cho riêng bà, do em trai bà là Trần Văn Khiêm chỉ huy, và nhóm này đã “bắt trái luật” một số người rồi.
104. Bilingual. 252. Tho appears indicate GVN intends prosecute Buddhists for May 8 affair, which is in direct conflict with Buddhist insistence GVN officials responsible for May 8 deaths/Thơ lộ vẻ cho thấy Chính phủ VN dự định truy tố các Phật tử về vụ ngày 8 tháng 5/1963, mâu thuẫn trực tiếp với yêu cầu của PG quy trách nhiệm các quan chức phải chịu trách nhiệm về những cái chết ngày 8 tháng 5 tại Huế.
105. Bilingual: 253. Nolting: Tension In Hue Was Mounting And More Buddhist Monks And Nuns Were Volunteering To Sacrifice Themselves / Nolting: Căng Thẳng Ở Huế Tăng Cao, Có Thêm Nhiều Tăng Ni Tình Nguyện Hy Sinh
106. Bilingual. 256. CIA: A change of government in Vietnam could occur at any time, with little or no warning and in an orderly or disorderly fashion. A coup d’etat may be engineered by the army, or by Ngo Dinh Nhu..
107. Bilingual. 258. Senator Mansfield: Viet Nam is not central to our defense interest or any other American/ TNS Mansfield: VN không phải là trung tâm của lợi ích quốc phòng Hoa Kỳ hay bất kỳ lợi ích nào khác của Mỹ mà đúng ra, VN nằm ngoài các lợi ích của Mỹ.

CHIẾN DỊCH “NƯỚC LŨ” TỔNG TẤN CÔNG CHÙA CHIỀN TOÀN QUỐC ĐÊM 20 RẠNG NGÀY 21/8/1963 CỦA CHÍNH QUYỀN

108. Bilingual. 261. President Diem decreed martial law, ordered the army to besiege pagodas nationwide / TT Diệm ban lệnh thiết quân luật, ra lệnh quân đội bao vây các chùa toàn quốc
109. Bilingual. 262. Police and army personnel raided Buddhist pagodas in Saigon and Hue yesterday using arms, grenades and tear gas. A number of Buddhists were reported killed or wounded, and many others were arrested./Cảnh Sát Và Quân Đội Đã Đột Kích Các Ngôi Chùa Phật Giáo Ở Sài Gòn Và Huế Ngày Hôm Qua Bằng Vũ Khí, Lựu Đạn Và Hơi Cay. Báo Cáo Cho Biết Nhiều Phật Tử Chết Hoặc Bị Thương, Và Nhiều Người Khác Đã Bị Bắt.
110Bilingual. 263. Hue’s main pagodas are reported to have been largely destroyed inside by combat police. A problem in US-Vietnamese relations has been created by the escape of two Buddhist priests from Xa Loi Pagoda into the adjacent USOM building where they sought and obtained refuge./Các ngôi chùa chính ở Huế đã bị cảnh sát chiến đấu phá hủy phần lớn bên trong. Một vấn đề trong quan hệ Mỹ-Việt gây ra do việc 2 nhà sư trốn thoát từ chùa Xá Lợi vào tòa nhà USOM gần bên, nơi 2 nhà sư vào xin trú ẩn.
112. Bilingual. 264. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency: Army and combat police elements assaulted Buddhist pagodas in Saigon and other principal cities. A number of Buddhist priests were reportedly killed or injured, and many others were arrested./

Tình Báo Quốc Phòng Hoa Kỳ: Quân Đội Và Cảnh Sát Chiến Đấu Tấn Công Các Chùa Ở Sài Gòn Và Các Thành Phố Chính Khác. Nhiều Tu Sĩ Phật Giáo Đã Bị Giết, Bị Thương, Và Nhiều Người Khác Bị Bắt.

113. Bilingual. 265. Colby: endeavor to induce the GVN quickly to take a series of favorable actions respecting the Buddhists / Colby (CIA): cố gắng thuyết phục Chính phủ VN nhanh chóng thực hiện một loạt hành động có lợi nhằm tôn trọng Phật tử105

114. Bilingual. 266. CIA: Student participation in these demonstrations is also increasing, particularly in Hue, where the firing this week of the university rector, who is known to be sympathetic to the Buddhists, has led to the resignation of many faculty members / CIA: Sinh viên tham dự biểu tình ngày càng đông, đặc biệt là ở Huế, nơi bãi chức Viện trưởng Đại học Huế (LM Cao Văn Luận), người có thiện cảm với Phật tử, đã làm nhiều giảng viên từ chức tập thể.
115. Bilingual. 267. Ball: I think we ought to go slow on advising Cabot to “eliminate the Nhus” as one of his first acts.,Thứ trưởng Ngoại giao Ball: tôi nghĩ chúng ta [Bộ Ngoại Giao Hoa Kỳ] nên chậm rãi trong việc khuyên Đại sứ Cabot Lodge “loại bỏ ông bà Ngô Đình Nhu” như một trong những hành động đầu tiên của ông Lodge.
116Bilingual. 268. Ball: Regardless of who is running the show, we should continue to seek the same objectives. We may deem it useful to throw our influence toward reducing or eliminating the power of the Nhus / Thứ trưởng Ngoại giao Ball: Bất kể ai đang điều hành VN, Hoa Kỳ nên tiếp tục tìm cùng mục tiêu. Có thể sẽ hữu dụng nếu chúng ta áp lực VN làm giảm hay gỡ bỏ quyền lực của ông bà Ngô Đình Nhu
117. Bilingual. 260. Lodge: Tone of Army radio broadcasts has a strong Nhu flavor; it is also to be noted that within 24 hours of coup, radio broadcast lengthy Nhu directive calling on Republican Youth to support government action./Đại sứ Lodge: Đài phát thanh Quân đội mang đầy giọng điệu ông Nhu; Trong vòng 24 giờ đầu cuộc đảo chính, đài phát thanh đã phát đi chỉ thị dài dòng của Nhu kêu gọi Đoàn Thanh niên Cộng hòa ủng hộ hành động của chính phủ.
118. Bilingual. 271. Nhu denied this amounted to a coup, but warned it could become one if Diem vacillated or compromised on the Buddhist issue. Ambassador Lodge notes that the resignation of Foreign Minister Mau ‘obviously caught the government flatfooted’./Nhu nói rằng điều này không phải là một cuộc đảo chính, nhưng cảnh báo nó có thể trở thành một cuộc đảo chính nếu TT Diệm có ý dao động hoặc thỏa hiệp về vấn đề Phật giáo. Đại sứ Lodge ghi nhận: việc Bộ trưởng Ngoại giao Vũ Văn Mẫu từ chức “rõ ràng đã khiến chính phủ VN chùn bước”.
119. Bilingual. 272. Ambassador Lodge has not yet been able to present his credentials owing to the unexpected resignation of Foreign Minister Maul According to CAS, Vice President Tho’s assistant also indicated that Tho may decide to resign “at the right moment."/Đại sứ Lodge vẫn chưa thể trình ủy nhiệm thư do Bộ trưởng Ngoại giao Vũ Văn Mẫu bất ngờ từ chức. Theo CAS (nguồn tin Hoa Kỳ kiểm soát), phụ tá của Phó Tổng thống Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ cũng nói rằng Phó Tổng Thống Thơ có thể sẽ quyết định từ chức “vào thời điểm thích nghi”.
120. Bilingual. 273. President had sent Madame Nhu, on 23 August, a letter in which he ordered her to make no public statements and give no press conferences. The President also instructed General Oai and the Director General of Information not to print any statement she might make. Both Counselor Nhu and Madame Nhu were “furious.” Thuan: Generals did not know beforehand of the planned raid on Xa Loi,/TT Diệm đã gửi bà Nhu, vào ngày 23 tháng 8, một lá thư trong đó ông Diệm cấm bà Nhu không được tuyên bố công khai nào và cấm bà họp báo. TT Diệm cũng chỉ đạo Tướng Trần Tử Oai và GĐ Tổng nha Thông tin không được in bất kỳ tuyên bố nào mà bà Nhu có thể đưa ra. Cả Cố vấn Nhu và Bà Nhu đều “nổi giận”. Bộ Trưởng Nguyễn Đình Thuần: Các tướng không biết trước kế hoạch tấn công Chùa Xá Lợi, Thuần cũng vậy.
121. Bilingual. 274. General Kim: 1426 people (Buddhist monks and laymen) have been arrested. All of explosives and arms found in pagodas were planted./Tướng Kim: 1426 người (tu sĩ Phật giáo và cư sĩ) đã bị bắt. Tất cả chất nổ và vũ khí tìm thấy trong chùa đều do người ông Nhu chở vào [để vu khống].
122. Bilingual. 275. Generals told President that morale of troops was deteriorating, and in fact they feared that one military post was near state of desertion. Generals said that wives of soldiers and junior officers were getting upset. President is still in the saddle what is going on now is being controlled by Nhu./ Các tướng nói với Tổng thống Diệm rằng tinh thần quân đội đang sa sút, và thực tế họ lo ngại rằng một đồn quân sự sắp rơi vào tình trạng đào ngũ toàn bộ. Các tướng nói rằng vợ của quân nhân và sĩ quan cấp dưới đang rất bất mãn. Tổng thống Diệm vẫn đang nắm quyền nhưng những gì đang diễn ra hiện nay đều do Nhu kiểm soát.
123Bilingual. 276. Vo Van Hai, Chief of Diem ‘s private staff, although a long-time Diem loyalist, Hai confided that he feared for his life and thought he was under surveillance by Nhu’s agents. Hai told Kattenburg that Nhu had “carefully stage-managed” the crackdown on the Buddhists./ Võ Văn Hải, Chánh Văn Phòng Riêng Của Tt Diệm, Dù Là Người Trung Thành Lâu Năm Với Ông Diệm, Hải Tâm Sự Rằng Hải Lo Sợ Cho Tính Mạng Của Hải Và Nghĩ Rằng Hải Đang Bị Mật Vụ Của Nhu Theo Dõi. Hải Nói Với Kattenburg Rằng Nhu Đã “Quản Lý Một Cách Cẩn Thận” Cuộc Đàn Áp Phật Tử.
124. Bilingual. 277. Mecklin: The senior officer told me that things were going exceptionally well. After he left, his deputy told me that the situation was rapidly deteriorating. MACV says the war is developing favorably. David Halberstam of the New York Times recently wrote to the contrary.
125. Bilingual. 278. Memorandum to President Kennedy: Brother Nhu is the mastermind behind the whole operation against the Buddhists and is calling the shots. There is disagreement on whether Diem has any political viability left, and on whether he could ever be brought to acquiesce in the removal of his brother.
126. Bilingual. 281. Ball: USG cannot accept actions against Buddhists taken by Nhu and his collaborators under cover martial law. Prompt dramatic actions redress situation must be taken, including repeal of decree 10,6 release of arrested monks, nuns, etc. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhus, but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we
127. Bilingual. 282. Krulak: US officials discussed a coup that derived from recommendations made by Thuan; General Taylor stated that we should give Diem an adequate chance to do what we want.
128. Bilingual. 283. Admiral Felt: Don indicated we must continue support Diem, forcing him to clean house. His suggestion was for the duration of the crisis to have an interim mixed Cabinet, military and civilian. Military should have three Cabinet posts. Don hopes U.S. will truly try bear down on Diem by delegating authority of [to?] Ministers and broadening his narrow outlook.
129. Bilingual. 284. CIA: General Khanh said the Army will take over the country if the politicians decide to seek an agreement with the DRV or even with Communist China for a neutralization of Viet Nam.
130. Bilingual. 285. Lodge asked permission from President Kennedy for him to go straight to Generals and tell them that the US prepared to have Diem without Nhus, but it is in effect up to them whether to keep Diem, and to insist Generals take steps to release Buddhist leaders and carry out the June 16 agreement.
131Bilingual. 287. VOA Broadcast: Vietnam’s secret police under the control of Ngo Dinh Nhu—not the Army—made the raids against Buddhist pagodas last week. Thousands of Buddhists were reported arrested, and at least four killed. America may cut its aid to Vietnam if President Diem does not get rid of the police officials responsible.
132. Bilingual. 288. LODGE: The VOA broadcast eliminated the surprise factor of the generals' effort, tending to increase the chance of bloodshed should there be a violent reaction to what is building up. Obviously the VOA statement cuts right across tactics I had planned. This is a time which calls for action and very few words. CIA: Nhu reportedly ordered the arrest of civilian oppositionists.
133. Bilingual. 289. President Kennedy asked if we are adequately prepared for protecting and/or evacuating U.S. citizens in Vietnam. Admiral Felt said that unless the Nhus were eliminated the middle-level enlisted men would soon lose their interest in fighting.
134. Bilingual. 290. Colonel Conein will tell General Khiem and General Khanh: Nhus must go; Retaining Diem or not up to them; Bonzes and other arrestees must be released immediately and five-point agreement of 16 June be fully carried out;
135. Bilingual. 291. General Khiem replied to Colonel Conein as follows: Generals were in accord with points expressed; Nhu has certain officers on General Don’s staff; Colonel Conein should stand by for later pickup by jeep that will take Colonel Conein to immediate future meeting with General Duong Van Minh; General Khiem concurred in contact with General Khanh about the secret mission
136. Bilingual. 292. Lodge told Diem: "It was interesting to me that people whom I had known all my life in politics thought that Madame Nhu was the Chief of State of Viet-Nam//Đại sứ Lodge nói với Tổng Thống Diệm: "Điều thú vị đối với tôi là những người mà tôi quen biết cả đời trong lĩnh vực chính trị lại nghĩ rằng Bà Ngô Đình Nhu là Quốc trưởng của VN (Chief of State of Viet-Nam)
137. Bilingual. 294. General Khanh told CAS officer: Khanh was not ready move now. Plan was to wait until Nhu moved in direction rapprochement with DRV then strike//Tướng Nguyễn Khánh nói với viên chức CIA: Khánh chưa sẵn sàng đảo chánh. Kế hoạch là chờ cho tới khi ông Ngô Đình Nhu tiến hành hòa giải với Bắc Việt thì sẽ đảo chánh.
137. Bilingual. 295. General Taylor asked General Harkins: Why was the Embassy's emergency plan to rely on commercial air to evacuate Americans, both civilians and military, out of Vietnam?
139. Bilingual. 296. Memorandum from Forrestal to President Kennedy
140. Bilingual. 298. Lodge’s report of one hour meeting with Nhu. Lodge said that no long range foreign policy could be carried out by the U.S. Government without the support of Congress and public opinion.

CUỘC ĐẢO CHÁNH QUÂN SỰ NGÀY 1/11/1963 

141. Bilingual. 299. General Khiem told Colonel Conein about the planning. A committee of Generals headed by General Duong Van Minh agreed that a coup will take place within one week.//Tướng Khiêm nói với Đại Tá Conein về kế hoạch đảo chánh. Một ủy ban các Tướng lĩnh do Tướng Dương Văn Minh đứng đầu đồng ý rằng cuộc đảo chính sẽ diễn ra trong vòng một tuần lễ nữa.
142. Bilingual300. Telegram From General Harkins: I am in direct liaison Embassy E & E officer on details.
143. Bilingual. 302. Memorandum From Forrestal to President Kennedy: A committee of generals has been formed for the purpose of bringing about a military coup within a week.
144. Bilingual. 303. Memorandum of Conference With the President. Ambassador Nolting acknowledged that the secret police had used brutal methods but he believed they had not been ordered to do so.
145Bilingual. 304. Mr. and Mrs. Ambassador Tran Van Chuong (parents of Madame Nhu) told General Lansdale: The US must act firmly and quickly to replace both Diem and Nhu with a new government.
146. Bilingual. 306. From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. Generals cited int he report as members coup committee are best group that could be assembled in terms of ability and orientation.
147. Bilingual. 307. Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency. Situation here has reached point of no return. Saigon is armed camp. Current indications are that Ngo family have dug in for last ditch battle.
148. Bilingual. 308. Foreign Reaction to Diem Repression and U.S. Foreign Policy. Press and public reaction to the events in Viet-Nam received to date is almost universally critical of Diem and, directly or by implication, the United States.
149. Bilingual. 1 (VOLUME IV, VIETNAM, AUGUST–DECEMBER 1963). Memorandum of Conference With the President. General Taylor reported on the U.S. forces in the area available to evacuate Americans in Vietnam, if required. He said 3000 to 4000 evacuees could be airlifted by U.S. forces now in Vietnam.
150. Bilingual. 2. Editorial Note. Colby: photographs of Ngo Dinh Nhu have appeared on some public buildings.
151. Bilingual. 3. The President’s Intelligence Checklist. Anti-aircraft guns have been emplaced in the Palace area. The shadow of Ngo Dinh Nhu looms ever larger. His picture has begun to show up in public buildings
152. Bilingual. 8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam. We continue to believe Nhus must go and coup will be needed..//  Điện văn từ Bộ Ngoại giao Hoa Kỳ gửi tới Đại sứ quán Hoa Kỳ tại VN. Chúng tôi tiếp tục tin rằng ông bà Ngô Đình Nhu phải ra đi và sẽ cần đến cuộc đảo chính
153. Bilingual. 10. Had three hour conversation with President Diem afternoon August 28. More than on earlier occasions (1955, 1958) he talked largely to himself.//Tôi (Kattenburg) có cuộc nói chuyện kéo dài ba giờ với Tổng thống Ngô Đình Diệm vào chiều ngày 28 tháng 8. Hơn những lần trước đó (1955, 1958), ông Diệm chủ yếu tự độc thoại với chính ông. Mặc dù chắc chắn rằng ông Diệm hoàn toàn làm chủ được các khả năng của ông nhưng không thể thoát khỏi ấn tượng về chứng loạn thần kinh ngày càng gia tăng nơi ông Diệm...
154. Bilingual. 12. Lodge: There is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration,...//Lodge: Không còn đường lùi nữa. Theo quan điểm của tôi, không có khả năng nào rằng cuộc chiến ở VN có thể chiến thắng dưới chính quyền Diệm, càng không có khả năng Diệm hoặc bất kỳ thành viên nào trong gia đình nhà Ngô có thể cai trị đất nước theo cách để giành được sự ủng hộ của những người đáng kính, tức là tầng lớp trí thức trong và ngoài cơ quan chính phủ, dân sự và quân sự
155. Bilingual. Ngày 29/8/1963. General Harkins: A problem facing the Generals and arguing against precipitate action on their part is I believe their genuine patriotic desire to accomplish their ends with absolute minimum of bloodshed and damage.//Tướng Harkins: Một vấn đề mà các Tướng phải đối mặt và lập luận chống lại hành động vội vàng từ phía họ là tôi tin rằng các tướng yêu nước thực sự và muốn đạt được mục đích với mức tối thiểu đổ máu và thiệt hại.
156. Bilingual. 15. Conference With the President. Secretary Rusk reported that both Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins agreed that the war against the Viet Cong in Vietnam cannot be won under the Diem regime//Họp với Tổng Thống Kennedy. Ngoại trưởng Rusk báo cáo rằng cả Đại sứ Lodge và Tướng Harkins đều đồng ý rằng cuộc chiến chống VC ở VN không thể thắng dưới chế độ Diệm. Tướng Harkins muốn tách ông bà Nhu ra khỏi Diệm.
157. Bilingual. 16. Telegram From the Department of State. The USG will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct involvement of U.S. Armed Forces.//Điện văn từ Bộ Ngoại giao Hoa Kỳ. Chính phủ Mỹ sẽ hỗ trợ một cuộc đảo chính có cơ hội thành công cao nhưng có kế hoạch không có sự tham gia trực tiếp của Lực lượng Vũ trang Hoa Kỳ.
158. Bilingual. 17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy. My own personal assessment is (and this is not an instruction) that the Nhus are by all odds the greater part of the problem in Viet-Nam, internally, internationally and for American public opinion.// Điện văn từ Bộ Ngoại giao gửi Đại sứ Lodge. Đánh giá cá nhân của tôi là (và đây không phải là một chỉ dẫn) rằng ông bà Nhu hoàn toànvấn đề lớn nhất ở Việt Nam, trong nội bộ VN, với dư luận quốc tế và đối với dư luận Mỹ.
159. Bilingual. 18. From the President to the Ambassador. Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions.
160. Bilingual. 19. From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon. A report from a source of medium reliability to the effect says that within 24 hours the govt would begin the arrest of Generals who might not be fully loyal.
161. Bilingual. 20. From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. I agree that getting the Nhus out is the prime objective and that they are “the greater part of the problem in Vietnam, internally, internationally and for American public opinion.”
162. Bilingual. 22. From the CIA Station in Saigon to the Agency. CAS officer has been having series of conversations over past several days with Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, former Chief of Kien Hoa Province
163. Bilingual. 24. From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the President. Subject: Probable Loyalties of Vietnamese Units and Commanders.
164. Bilingual. 25. Memorandum to the Secretary of State. Possible Diem-Nhu Moves and U.S. Responses. Diem-Nhu Move: Preemptive arrest and assassination of opposition military officers and/or Vice President Tho.
165. Bilingual. 26. Memorandum of Conversation. Secretary of State, in the Chair. Mr. Helms described what seemed to him to be Nhu’s plan, that is, to hold pro-government rallies, set up pro-government Buddhist groups
166. Bilingual. 33. Telegram From General Harkins. I had a talk with Brig Gen Khiem, Chief JGS, this morning. Asked where Col Thao, CAS 0483, stood in the picture.
167. Bilingual. 34. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam. Perhaps an arrangement could be worked out whereby the following could be made to happen: Madame Nhu to leave the country, Mr. Nhu’s functions to be limited entirely to Strategic Hamlets, the office of Prime Minister to be created and Mr. Thuan to become Prime Minister; Archbishop Thuc to leave the country.

168. Bilingual. 39. To Ambassador Lodge. President Kennedy may well be obliged at next press conference to express US disapproval of repressive measures.
169.  Bilingual. 40. From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam. It seems to me that we must keep our eye fixed on the main purpose of our presence in South Viet-Nam
170. Bilingual. 41. US Assurances to the Generals. On August 27 Conein assured General Khiem that the US would do all in its power to assist the families of the generals engaged in the coup plot in the event of its failure.
171. Bilingual 42. From the Embassy. I do not, however, exclude the possibility that an improved situation can be created if Madame Nhu and Archbishop Thuc could leave the country
172. Bilingual. 44. From the Embassy. Nhu will resign, leave the government service for good and move to Dalat after he has lifted martial law,
173. Bilingual. 46. From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon. Kim said that Nhu clearly expected coup attempt, that Tung’s special forces were on full alert, and that they were in a position to prevent any coup attempt from succeeding at this time.
174. Bilingual. 47. From the CIA Station in Saigon. He then cited Nhu press interview circa 8 May in which Nhu said he looking forward to reduction American aid as instance handwriting on wall which not appreciated by Americans. Reiterated earlier statements that Nhu basically anti-American.
175. Bilingual. 48. From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon. Nhu convened a meeting with 15 generals. General Duong Van Minh asked how to answer Americans who ask what we think of present situation. Nhu replied either state no comment or say you do not have enough information to comment.
176. Bilingual. 50. Interview With the President. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We are prepared to continue to assist them
177. Bilingual. 51. Draft telegram to Lodge. Results your talk with Nhu promising on surface but we fear stalling tactics. Thus Nhu [in?] Dalat could still be power behind throne.
178. Bilingual. 56. From the Department of State. Thus, Nhu in Dalat would be some improvement, but he could still be power behind throne; Madame Nhu’s tour could be plus for her local prestige unless she stays away a long time and takes a vacation rather than a speech making world tour (we would emphatically oppose her speaking in the US).
179Bilingual. 58. From the Embassy. Nhu is certainly not contemplating a change in GVN policies and actions.
180. Bilingual. 60. From the Embassy. I do not believe their word is good; Nhu’s resignation surely would mean very little; Madame Nhu’s departure is obviously intended to be a triumphant lecture tour.
181. Bilingual. 61. Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) and the President. Kennedy: There’s an article in The New York Times by Tad Schultz [Szulc], page 5, in which he says that officials say that Nhu is trying to blackmail us.
182. Bilingual. 63. From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed far-reaching doubts regarding not only Diem-Nhu leadership but also advisability of continued US participation in Viet-Nam war.
183. Bilingual. 64. Letter From Vu Van Thai to the Under Secretary of State. Vu Van Thai was currently a representative of the United Nations stationed in Togo. Now I am pleading that the US does its utmost to prevent the further crushing of the Buddhist movement
184. Bilingual. 66. Conference With the President. Rusk: Unless Diem acts promptly, there will be a drastic effect in the U.S involving both reduction in economic and military assistance and strong pressure to withdraw U.S political support of Vietnam.
185. Bilingual. 68. From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Two intelligence reports received today reflect the heightened contempt which Ngo Dinh Nhu, his wife, and other close confidants of the Ngo family hold for the United States
186. Bilingual. 69. From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon. Nhu feels there are too many American civilians in Saigon and that some of these personnel are maintaining continual campaign of anti-GVN criticism.
187. Bilingual. 70. From the Department of State. It is clear that as a minimum we face a major problem with world, with US Congress and with American public which will require GVN to take actions to restore its image so that we may continue to support it.
188. Bilingual. 71. From the Department of State to the Embassy. It has been decided to make an intensive effort to obtain at first hand information on attitudes toward GVN held by wide spectrum of populace.
189. Bilingual. 72. From the Embassy in Vietnam. They explained that passage of a resolution described in the telegram would be an irreversible action and would commit every Senator voting for it to vote against further appropriations.
190. Bilingual. 73. From the Department of State. Herewith set of questions to which answers desired here soonest. Request all assets mission participate as required with Krulak and Mendenhall in providing coordinated answers.
191. Bilingual. 74. From the White House to the President. Cable to Lodge follows; per Hilsman, Rusk requests you clear this with the President for release.
192. Bilingual. 75. From the Embassy in Vietnam. Embassy believes would be preferable omit Tri Quang from discussion on release of bonzes.
193. Bilingual. 76. From the Embassy in Vietnam. Thuan opened the conversation by saying that he felt completely useless now. Nhu says that he has been bought by the Americans, and would certainly kill him if he tried to resign.
194. Bilingual. 77. President Diem talked with Ambassador Lodge. My first advice to him was that Mr. Nhu should go away
195. Bilingual. 78. From Joseph Mendenhall. I have been struck by fear which pervades Saigon, Hue, and Da Nang. These cities have been living under reign of terror which continues.
196. Bilingual. 79. The Pentagon's report disagrees with the State Department's telegram. Hilsman says he and Harriman are sore as hell over “dirty pool” in Pentagon.
197. Bilingual. 80. From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon. Believe GVN obviously had no conception of results which would flow from GVN restrictions prior 8 May.
198. Bilingual. 81. To the Director of the United States Information Agency. There is mounting evidence that the war cannot be won with the present regime, especially in view of the damage done to popular support during the Buddhist crisis.
199. Bilingual. 82. Report by General Krulak. All Corps were visited. Substantive conversations were held with 87 members of the advisory system, from enlisted men of relatively low rank to senior officers.
200. Bilingual. 83. Memorandum of Conversation. General Krulak briefed his written report, “Visit to Vietnam, 7-10 September 1963”.
201. Bilingual. 84. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation about a proposed bill.
202. Bilingual. 85. Memorandum of Conversation. The Attorney General stated his view that we should now concentrate on specifics. All agreed that the war would go better without Nhu and Diem.
203. Bilingual. 86. From the Embassy. That it is worsening rapidly; That the time has arrived for the US to use what effective sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing government and the installation of another.
204. Bilingual. 87. White House Staff Meeting. Diem’s brother, Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, was coming to the United States, having left Rome today. The purpose of his visit will be to make arrangements for Madam Nhu’s visit.
205. Bilingual. 89. U.S. Objectives. The U.S. policy objective should continue to be the maintenance of a viable, strong and free area in South Viet-Nam capable of maintaining its independence, successfully resisting Communist aggression, and susceptible to U.S. influence
206. Bilingual. 90. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State. Statement by the U.S. to Diem and/or publicly to the effect that U.S. demands that the GVN cease the use of all U.S.-supplied equipment for the repression of non-Communists.
207. Bilingual. 91. Memorandum Prepared by Michael V. Forrestal. The purpose of this memorandum is to analyze some of the favorable and adverse consequences of a U.S. policy toward South Vietnam
208. Bilingual. 92. From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Proliferating reports of varying credibility allege activity on the part of Ngo Dinh Nhu to negotiate with Hanoi on South Vietnam’s future, with or without French connivance.
209. Bilingual. 93. Memorandum of Conversation. If U.S. presence is not needed now, we should leave, but we want to leave behind an independent Vietnam. We cannot leave if to do so consists of abandoning Vietnam to the Viet Cong.
210. Bilingual. 94. Conference With the President. Rusk emphasized that Nhu has become a symbol which has to be removed.
211. Bilingual. 95. From the Director of the United States Information Agency. This will serve as guidelines for our media output on Viet-Nam.
212. Bilingual. 97. From the Department of State. The State Department is planning for multiple pressures, public and private, to remove Nhus from scene.
213. Bilingual. 98. Draft Telegram From the Department of State. Our central objective remains a secure and independent South Viet-Nam even though, at some future date, it may be possible to consider a free, independent and non-communist unified country.
214. Bilingual. 99. Record of a Meeting. The Group initially read a CIA summary of all the messages which had come in over the past two days.
215. Bilingual. 100. Editorial Note. Continue and strengthen Vice President Tho’s committee to negotiate a settlement of the Buddhist problem,
216. Bilingual. 102. From the Embassy in Vietnam. Lodge: Visiting Diem is an extremely time-consuming procedure, and it seems to me there are many better ways in which I can use my waking hours.
217.  Bilingual. 103. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation. McCone said he is becoming increasingly concerned over the report of the possibility of Nhu making a deal up north. He said he is going out to the station to say concentrate attention immediately on that problem.
218. Bilingual. 104. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam. I ask that you show this letter to the President personally. For maximum security I am typing it myself and am sending it to you by messenger.
219.  Bilingual. 105. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone). Ambassador and Trueheart convinced war cannot be won with regime, timing [time] running out, cutting off aid would provoke unpredictable and uncontrollable situation; Ambassador considering initiating coup through General Don with MACV.
220. Bilingual. 106. From the Embassy in Vietnam. Agree another demarche by me to Diem to prevent Mme. Nhu from talking would be a mistake. I have already told both Diem and Nhu that she should stop talking.
221. Bilingual. 108. From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. Murrow: Some sympathy for the U.S. dilemma in Viet-Nam has emerged in the last week, particularly in Western Europe, but most comment is still critical of U.S. policies.
222. Bilingual. 110. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Nhu exercises an overriding, immutable influence over Diem. He has discredited, neutralized, or caused the removal of many competent and loyal advisors to Diem
223. Bilingual. 111. From the Embassy in Vietnam. Lodge: They are absolutely sure of our aid and know that it comes along automatically no matter what they do and that I am really not needed.
224. Bilingual. 112. White House Staff Meeting. Forrestal reported that martial law and censorship had been lifted, and that free elections were scheduled. He added that the practical effects of this were not known.
225. Bilingual. 113. Record of a Meeting. Rusk then asked if there had been any thought given to discussing with the GVN the prospect of getting Tri Quang out of the country rather than releasing him to be a continuing annoyance in Vietnam
226. Bilingual. 114. From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State. Attached are two cables—one on the “Reconciliation Track” and one on the “Pressures and Persuasion Track.”
227. Bilingual. 115. Draft Letter From President Kennedy to President Diem. I am sending you this letter because of the gravity of the situation which now confronts our two countries, in their relations with each other.
228. Bilingual. 117. Editorial Note. On September 16, 1963, David Halberstam reported in The New York Times that there were basic disagreements between the United States and South Vietnam over the strategic hamlet program
229.  Bilingual. 118. Conversation Between the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Kattenburg) and Madame Tran Van Chuong. Madame Chnong told me in conspiratorial tones that “many Vietnamese of all parties” had asked her husband to head up a government of national unity.
230. Bilingual. 119. From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon. Second week of September Generals formally requested President Diem to turn over to military key Departments of Defense, Interior, Psychological Warfare, and Education.
231. Bilingual. 122. From the Deputy Regional Planning Adviser of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Mendenhall). I found a virtually complete breakdown of the civil government in Saigon following the events of August 20, 1963.
231Bilingual. 123. Memorandum by the Assistant Director for Rural Affairs, United States Operations Mission, Vietnam (Phillips). At present he has support from certain key military figures such as Col. Tung and General Ton That Dinh
232. Bilingual. 126. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam. If Secretary of Defense and General Taylor come to Viet-Nam, they will have to call on President Diem and I will have to accompany them.
233.Bilingual. 128. For Ambassador Lodge from the President. I quite understand the problem you see in visit of McNamara and Taylor.
234. Bilingual. 130. Ambassador Lodge reported to President Kennedy. Agree that no good opportunity for action to remove present government in immediate future is apparent
235. Bilingual. 131. Eyes only for President only. Diem will not let any of the leadership elements out unless he is satisfied that they are thoroughly cowed and will cause no further trouble.
236. Bilingual. 132. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman). The conversation between Rusk and Hilsman was about the unclear situation of Nhu's talks with the North Vietnamese through Maneli.
237. Bilingual. 133. From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara).
238Bilingual. 134. From Gen Harkins. From most of the reports and articles I read, one would say Vietnam and our programs here are falling apart at the seams.
239. Bilingual. 135. Ex-Ambassador Tran Van Chuong called on General Taylor. He thinks that there can be no final victory with the Diem Government which is more disliked by the people of the country than was the government of Bao Dai.
240. Bilingual. 136. From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman). Since May 8, and especially since August 21, discontent in Vietnamese society has been accompanied by a spread of fear, uncertainty and frustration regarding the future
241. Bilingual. 137. Ambassador Lodge wrote to President Kennedy. Chief of USOM suggested holding up on technical assistance and dollar support for the communications program conducted by the Vietnamese Director of Information
242. Bilingual. 138. General “Big” Minh’s evaluation. Minh thought VC were gaining steadily in strength and 80 percent of population now have no basis for choice between GVN and VC.
243. Bilingual. 139. To the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt). Gen. Harkins: the wealth of rumors that were still going around Saigon. I said one of the rumors was that he (Thuan) wanted to resign and get out of the country.
244. Bilingual. 140. From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam. USOM Saigon could require written guarantees from GVN agencies that AID equipment provided hereafter not be used in actions of repression.
245. Bilingual. 143. Meeting on McNamara/Taylor Mission to South Vietnam. He thought that it would in fact be necessary for Secretary McNamara to see President Diem twice. In these visits he should press the need for reform and change as a pragmatic necessity and not as a moral judgment.
246. Bilingual. 144. Letter to the Ambassador in Vietnam. Hilsman: I think you are probably right in the judgment that no pressures—even a cut-off in aid—will cause Diem and Nhu to make the changes we desire and that what we must work for is a change in government
247. Bilingual. 146. Memorandum for the Record by Lieutenant Colonel Sidney Berry, Jr. The essence of the mission is to appraise the effectiveness of the SVN military effort to defeat the Viet Cong and to evaluate present and future prospects for success.
248. Bilingual. 147. Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem. President’s own judgment is that this letter is not appropriate and not likely to be productive.
249. Bilingual. 149. From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency. Khiem cited recent Viet Cong show of strength in battlefield, where ARVN losses for first time almost as heavy as Viet Cong’s.
250. Bilingual. 150. Report by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara). Smith, a professor at a leading American University, speaks Vietnamese fluently, is an oriental scholar, possesses wide contact among the leaders of both North and South Vietnam.
251. Bilingual. 151. Memorandum Prepared for the Director of Central Intelligence. Joseph Alsop’s article in the 18 September Washington Post was based are but the most recent signs that the GVN, the DRV, and the French may have been engaged of late in exploring the possibilities of some kind of North-South rapprochement
252. Bilingual. 153. Ambassador Lodge suggested to VOA. I propose that immediate study be made to ascertain the feasibility of VOA broadcasting a series of utterances in Vietnamese to South Viet-Nam at regular intervals
253. Bilingual. 155. Notes on National Assembly elections in Vietnam.
254. Bilingual. 156. Ambassador Lodge proposed cutting aid selectively to force the Diem government to change.
255. Bilingual. 157. Eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. Hypotheses examined consist of (a) revamped and broadened Diem Government with or without Nhu playing some role, (b) successor government headed by Tho and (c) government under preponderantly military leadership
256. Bilingual. 158. Memorandum of Conversation. During the first two hours of the meeting, President Diem held forth on the course of the war. During the third hour, Secretary McNamara explained, briefly but deliberately and with considerable force, the concern of the U.S. Government at the recent political unrest in Viet-Nam
257. Bilingual. 159. Conversation with Vice President Tho. He said that it was obvious that police state methods were being used and that this was creating deep discontent and yet we were unable to do anything about it.
258. Bilingual. 160. Memorandum of a Conversation by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara). The machinery to dominate the people is as perfect as that employed by the Communists. The government has established a police State although the family has successfully disguised this fact.
259. Bilingual. 161. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs’ Special Assistant (Sullivan). I talked at length with the French Charge, the Canadian ICC Commissioner, and the Indian ICC Commissioner on the subject of relations between North and South Vietnam
260. Bilingual. 162. Taylor's farewell call on General Minh. General Minh as always is deeply concerned over the country. He considers that many difficulties remain in the military program.
261. Bilingual. 163. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to President Diem.
262. Bilingual. 164. Possible Political Proposals at the United Nations General Assembly re Viet-Nam
263. Bilingual. 165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations. Ambassador Buu Hoi called on Hilsman. U.S. opinion had been and remained deeply affected by repressions against religious and student groups.
264. Bilingual. 166. Discussion with Buu Hoi. We could not be caught in the role of an apologist for the Viet Nam Government on the substance of the matter, as long as most of the world is convinced that the GVN has been persecuting Buddhists.
265. Bilingual. 167. Report of McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam. There are serious political tensions in Saigon (and perhaps elsewhere in South Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government is becoming increasingly unpopular.
266. Bilingual. 168. Ambassador Buu Hoi talks with the US Secretary of State. He felt that no government has had worse public relations than his. The demonstrations which erupted in Hue in early May were triggered by orders from Saigon that the Buddhist flag should be pulled down;
267. Bilingual. 169. The 519th Meeting of the National Security Council. The President opened the meeting by summarizing where we now stand on U.S. policy toward Vietnam.
268. Bilingual. 170. Statement of U.S. policy. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965
269. Bilingual. 171. CIA Telegram. Conein met with Don in Nha Trang. Don: Gen Ton That Dinh has realized he was “played for a fool” during his tenure as Military Governor of Saigon.
270. Bilingual. 172. Memorandum of Meeting. Secretary McNamara said we cannot stay in the middle much longer. The program outlined in his report will push us toward a reconciliation with Diem or toward a coup to overthrow Diem.
271. Bilingual. 174. Record of a Meeting of the Executive Committee. The purpose of the meeting was to examine a second effort on the part of the drafting group to cover the economic and political actions recommended in the McNamara-Taylor trip report
272. Bilingual. 175. The recommended US actions are designed to indicate to the Diem Government our displeasure. The recommendation would continue to freeze the present $5 million and would withhold the second quarter allotment.
273. Bilingual. 176. Eyes only for Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Halberstam story in Times today says you “would be happier with a new CIA Chief”
274. Bilingual. 177. Lt. Col. Conein met with Gen. Duong Van Minh. Gen. Minh added the Generals were aware the situation is deteriorating rapidly and that action to change the government must be taken or the war will be lost to the Viet Cong because the government no longer has the support of the people.
275. Bilingual. 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. My recommendation, in which General Harkins concurs, is that Conein when next approached by Minh should:
276. Bilingual. 179. Presidential Conference on South Vietnam. The President asked what would be the impact of a suspension of the Commodity Import Program. Mr. Bell replied that the Commodity Import Program accounted for approximately 40 percent of South Vietnam’s imports.
277. Bilingual. 180. Eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. He thinks it of the greatest importance that, to the very limit of our abilities, we should not open this next stage in the press.
278. Bilingual. 181. From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam. Actions are designed to indicate to Diem Government our displeasure at its political policies and activities and to create significant uncertainty in that government and in key Vietnamese groups as to future intentions of United States
279. Bilingual. 182. From the White House to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge). President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup.
280. Bilingual. 183. Divergent Attitudes in U.S. Official Community. The civilians, on the other hand (with the exception of USOM), are oriented towards a more passive and more frustrating task of attempting to dissuade an oriental regime from its method of governing and to persuade it to use other methods which involve more empathy towards the popular mind.
281. Bilingual. 184. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. I plan to let the continued suspension of the Commodity Import Program become evident without my calling attention to it in so many words.
282. Bilingual. 185. From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. Lodge: I will personally control knowledge of future cables, limiting them. It is indeed most desirable to confront the Government of Viet-Nam with deeds rather than words, which are of little use, and I will certainly accept whatever dissatisfaction all this causes to reporters.
283. Bilingual. 186. From Ambassador Lodge to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. U.S. has provided the weapons, training and money to enable Nhu to have in effect adequate army of his own
284. Bilingual. 187. Memorandum of White House Staff Meeting. Everyone is bracing for Madame Nhu’s visit. Biên bản họp các viên chức Bạch Ốc. Mọi người đang chuẩn bị cho chuyến thăm Hoa Kỳ của bà Ngô Đình Nhu.
285Bilingual. 188. Talk between the US Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister.
286Bilingual. 189. President Kennedy meets with the French Foreign Minister. He felt that in the long run, evolution seemed to lead in the direction of the unification and neutrality of Vietnam.
287. Bilingual. 190. Foreign Relations Committee Session with Secretary McNamara. He observed that there were also no significant differences between Diem and Nhu, although characterizing Diem as the public figure and Nhu as the real operator, with neither controlling Madame Nhu.
288. Bilingual. 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. A highly dependable source told me that three weeks ago in the early hours of the morning, the police entered the premises of a Catholic institution and removed three young women, taking them to a sort of prison.
289. Bilingual. 192. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Ambassador in Vietnam. We would like to be informed on what is being contemplated but we should avoid being drawn into reviewing or advising on operational plans or any other act which might tend to identify U.S. too closely with change in government.
290. Bilingual. 193. For Rusk and Harriman from Lodge. The CIA distributed intelligence, which it cautioned should “be treated with reserve”, to the effect that Nhu had ordered a student demonstration against the U.S. Embassy in which he planned to use 100 agents to attack the Embassy, assassinate Lodge and other Embassy officials, and set the chancery afire.
291. Bilingual. 194. National Security Action Memorandum No. 263. At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.
292. Bilingual. 195. Eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. Ambassador Lodge from the President. The course of action set out in Deptel 534 obviously requires closest coordination between you and Washington
293. Bilingual. 196. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report. The Times of Vietnam chooses to interpret the statements as indicative of continued American determination to overthrow the regime if it does not give in to American pressures for reform.
294. Bilingual. 197. From Ambassador Lodge to President Kennedy. Our presence here is a stabilizing influence in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia; it also keeps the GVN from being overthrown, which would undoubtedly happen if we were not here.
295. Bilingual. 198. Talking about the support for special forces. Gen. Stilwell was instructed to indicate to Thuan that unless the civilian companies were effectively subordinated to the JGS and committed to field operations, all support of these companies would cease.
296. Bilingual. 199. Letter to the Counselor for Public Affairs at the Embassy in Vietnam (Mecklin). Your memo to Ambassador Lodge pertaining to the possible closing down of our field support posts is disquieting.
297. Bilingual. 200. Memorandum From the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. It is all very well for us to assert that all Washington agencies are now agreed upon a policy of graduated pressure on the GVN designed to obtain: 1) continuing progress in war effort, 2) improvement in the GVN’s popular support, and 3) improvement in relations between the US and the GVN
298. Bilingual. 201. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group. A proposed release on plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel from the Republic of Vietnam beginning in November
299. Bilingual. 202. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. Among educated classes in urban areas general aura of unrest and discontent persists beneath surface. We hear continued rumors, probably officially inspired, of plans for sacking Embassy and USIS.
300.  Bilingual. 203. Ambassador Lodge talked with Secretary Nguyen Dinh Thuan. Thuan said: “The President wanted me to ask you whether Washington had reached any decision regarding resumption of commercial imports.”
301. Bilingual. 204. Nhu’s Interview in Times of Vietnam. He said: “Whether it is under this government or under some other government, the confidence between the Vietnamese people and the American government has been lost.
302. Bilingual. 205. Editorial Note. Statistics on the insurgency in South Vietnam
303. Bilingual. 206. Telegram From the Army Attache in Vietnam (Jones). Colonel Nguyen Khuong stated that if things continue unchanged VC will win by 1965, VC now in phase III (change from company to battalion-size units) and building up to phase IV
304. Bilingual. 207. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam. Eyes only for President. Vice President Tho said there are only 15 to 20 such all-around hamlets in the area south of Saigon which are really good.
305. Bilingual. 208. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. Col. Tung reacted strongly to the statement that Special Forces would no longer be supported unless they are subordinated to the direct, effective control of the JGS.
306. Bilingual. 209. Editorial Note. Lodge reported that he had talked with Harkins on the afternoon of October 23 about the U.S. approach to coup planning against Diem.
307. Bilingual. 210. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency. Highly reliable source reports coup imminent led by Lt. Col. Pham Ngoc Thao. Originally scheduled 1300 hrs 24 Oct but Major Nguyen Van Tu
308. Bilingual. 211. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) and the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins).
309. Bilingual. 212. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff.
310. Bilingual. 213. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor). In the past two weeks two different officers in the advisory detachments here in Saigon have been approached by Khuong asking if the U.S. would back a coup
311. Bilingual. 214. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor). I did tell Don my reason for mentioning Col Khuong was indicated in my MAC 1991 to avoid having advisors approached on matters that are not within their domain
312. Bilingual. 215. Editorial Note. According to CIA telegram [document number not declassified] from Saigon, October 25, 1963, Conein and Don met on the night of October 24. Don stated that he could not now hand over to Lodge the coup committee’s plans for political organization as he had promised earlier.
313. Bilingual. 216. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). I feel sure that the reluctance of the Generals to provide the United States with full details of their plans at this time
314. Bilingual. 217. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge). We will continue to be grateful for all additional information giving increased clarity to prospects of action by Don or others,
315. Bilingual. 218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam. Diem’s invitation to you may mean that he has finally decided to come to you.
316. Bilingual. 219. Letter From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge).
317. Bilingual. 220. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. Thuan spoke to me that Diem had had elaborate studies made about what steps they could take without our aid and all had concluded that without our aid they could not go on.
318. Bilingual. 221. Ambassador Lodge met with President of the Republic of Vietnam Ngô Đình Diệm. Diem said that he supposed I knew that Tri Quang had been communicating with the outside world and that he had dropped some papers out the window onto the street.
319. Bilingual. 222. Memorandum for the Record by the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak). At the direction of General Taylor I called on Representative Zablocki to discuss his Vietnam visit.
320. Bilingual. 223. Herbicide Operations in Viet-Nam. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Kattenburg). Chemical defoliation and crop destruction operations are effective weapons against the VC.
321. Bilingual. 224. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State. General Don sought me out and asked me whether Conein was authorized to speak for me. I said that he was.
322. Bilingual. 225. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State. Don had told Amb Lodge that he and his group had no political ambitions, that their only desire was to win the war against the VC and re-establish the prestige of Vietnam and the Army.
323. Bilingual. 226. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State. The acknowledged involvement of General Dinh is an extremely variable factor. The Generals seem acutely aware of this and Don states that they have him under 24-hour a day surveillance
324. Bilingual. 227. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins). In a discussion of the Vietnam situation at the JCS meeting with the Secretary of Defense on 28 October
325. Bilingual. 228. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State. Bui Diem said he had frequent contact with General Kim and that Kim most politically astute of Generals.
326. Bilingual. 229. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State. Evening 25 October former Asst Minister of Defense, Tran Trung Dung, told CAS officer he had learned general officers planning coup within ten days. Coup to be led by Generals Don, “Big Minh”,
327. Bilingual. 230. Paper Prepared for the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman). General Duong Van (“Big”) Minh—leader of coup group and apparently its military planner. Most respected and popular of all military officers. General Le Van Kim—political planner for the coup. General Tran Van Don—contact man for coup group with Americans, other Generals and division commanders.
328. Bilingual. 231. Issues For Consideration At the October 29 Meeting. What other American officials in Saigon should be made privy to coup information to enable them to act in Lodge’s absence? Recommendations: Mr. Trueheart (the DCM), General Harkins (who will play an important role in the protection of Americans in Viet-Nam)
329. Bilingual. 232. Check list for 4 pm meeting. Estimate of quality and quantity of military leadership committed. Lodge’s Movements
330. Bilingual. 233. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President. Item for your 4 o’clock meeting this afternoon.
331. Bilingual. 234. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy. Colby estimated that the pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces were about even, approximately 9800 on each side, with 18,000 listed as neutral
332.  Bilingual. 235. Memorandum of a Conference With President Kennedy. A revised cable to Ambassador Lodge was circulated to the group. The paragraph referring to post-Diem government matters should be dropped. Lodge should be told that from here we can see that a disaster could take place and that if the rebels can’t win, it would not be sensible for them to go ahead.
333. Bilingual. 236. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge). We note particularly Don’s curiosity your departure
334. Bilingual. 237. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon. Available info here indicates that Generals do not have clear preponderance of force in Saigon area, posing possibility of extended fighting, which we wish to avoid, or even defeat.
335. Bilingual. 238. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State. On 28 October 1963 Tran Quoc Buu stated to a CAS officer that the CVTC and the Vietnamese people as a whole would willingly support a military government brought about by force of arms.
336. Bilingual. 239. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. We should decide that we will not again give the GVN a blank check and that for the future all aid will be given, for example, on a quarterly basis so that at all times we have some control
337. Bilingual. 240. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor). Incidentally he leaves for Washington tomorrow (31st) afternoon. If the coup is to happen before the second he’s hardly going to get two days notice.
338. Bilingual. 241. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. Undoubtedly Can Lao profits from wide range economic concessions not necessarily related [Page 483] aid programs
339. 


 





Gủi hàng từ MỸ về VIỆT NAM
Gủi hàng từ MỸ về VIỆT NAM
Tạo bài viết
24/08/2015(Xem: 10832)
Thời Phật giáo xuống đường vào những năm 1960, anh Cao Huy Thuần là một nhà làm báo mà tôi chỉ là một đoàn sinh GĐPT đi phát báo. Thuở ấy, tờ LẬP TRƯỜNG như một tiếng kèn xông xáo trong mặt trận văn chương và xã hội của khuynh hướng Phật giáo dấn thân, tôi mê nhất là mục Chén Thuốc Đắng của Ba Cao do chính anh Thuần phụ trách. Đó là mục chính luận sắc bén nhất của tờ báo dưới hình thức phiếm luận hoạt kê. Rồi thời gian qua đi, anh Thuần sang Pháp và ở luôn bên đó. Đạo pháp và thế sự thăng trầm..
Nguồn tin của Báo Giác Ngộ từ quý Thầy tại Phật đường Khuông Việt và gia đình cho biết Giáo sư Cao Huy Thuần, một trí thức, Phật tử thuần thành, vừa trút hơi thở cuối cùng xả bỏ huyễn thân vào lúc 23 giờ 26 phút ngày 7-7-2024 (nhằm mùng 2-6-Giáp Thìn), tại Pháp.
"Chỉ có hai ngày trong năm là không thể làm được gì. Một ngày gọi là ngày hôm qua và một ngày kia gọi là ngày mai. Ngày hôm nay mới chính là ngày để tin, yêu và sống trọn vẹn. (Đức Đạt Lai Lạt Ma 14)